Kaminsky is famous among hackers for discovering, in , a fundamental flaw in the Internet which would have allowed a skilled coder to take over any Web site or even to shut down the Internet. Kaminsky alerted the Department of Homeland Security and executives at Microsoft and Cisco to the problem and worked with them to patch it. Bitcoin, he felt, was an easy target. Only the most paranoid, painstaking coder in the world could avoid making mistakes.
In a windowless room jammed with computers, Kaminsky paced around talking to himself, trying to build a mental picture of the bitcoin network. But when he found the right spot, there was a message waiting for him. The same thing happened over and over, infuriating Kaminsky. He was like a burglar who was certain that he could break into a bank by digging a tunnel, drilling through a wall, or climbing down a vent, and on each attempt he discovered a freshly poured cement barrier with a sign telling him to go home.
Kaminsky ticked off the skills Nakamoto would need to pull it off. Soon after creating the currency, Nakamoto posted a nine-page technical paper describing how bitcoin would function. That document included three references to the work of Stuart Haber, a researcher at H. Labs, in Princeton. Haber is a director of the International Association for Cryptologic Research and knew all about bitcoin.
Haber noted that the community of cryptographers is very small: about three hundred people a year attend the most important conference, the annual gathering in Santa Barbara. In all likelihood, Nakamoto belonged to this insular world. If I wanted to find him, the Crypto conference would be the place to start.
It was a foggy Monday morning in mid-August, and dozens of college cheerleaders had gathered on the athletic fields of the University of California at Santa Barbara for a three-day training camp. Their hollering could be heard on the steps of a nearby lecture hall, where a group of bleary-eyed cryptographers, dressed in shorts and rumpled T-shirts, muttered about symmetric-key ciphers over steaming cups of coffee.
This was Crypto , and the list of attendees included representatives from the National Security Agency, the U. Cryptographers are little known outside this hermetic community, but our digital safety depends on them. They write the algorithms that conceal bank files, military plans, and your e-mail. He is a friendly, diminutive man who is a professor of cryptography at the University of California at Davis and who has also taught at Chiang Mai University, in Thailand. He bowed when he shook my hand, and I explained that I was trying to learn more about what it would take to create bitcoin.
Nakamoto had good reason to hide: people who experiment with currency tend to end up in trouble. In , a Hawaiian resident named Bernard von NotHaus began fabricating silver and gold coins that he dubbed Liberty Dollars. Nine years later, the U. In , the federal government filed charges against e-Gold, a company that sold a digital currency redeemable for gold. The government argued that the project enabled money laundering and child pornography, since users did not have to provide thorough identification.
The company was effectively shut down. Nakamoto seemed to be doing the same things as these other currency developers who ran afoul of authorities. He was competing with the dollar and he insured the anonymity of users, which made bitcoin attractive for criminals. This winter, a Web site was launched called Silk Road, which allowed users to buy and sell heroin, LSD, and marijuana as long as they paid in bitcoin.
Still, Lewis Solomon, a professor emeritus at George Washington University Law School, who has written about alternative currencies, argues that creating bitcoin might be legal. Gray areas, however, are dangerous, which may be why Nakamoto constructed bitcoin in secret.
It may also explain why he built the code with the same peer-to-peer technology that facilitates the exchange of pirated movies and music: users connect with each other instead of with a central server. There is no company in control, no office to raid, and nobody to arrest.
Today, bitcoins can be used online to purchase beef jerky and socks made from alpaca wool. In late August, I learned that bitcoins could also get me a room at a Howard Johnson hotel in Fullerton, California, ten minutes from Disneyland. I booked a reservation for my four-year-old daughter and me and received an e-mail from the hotel requesting a payment of By this time, it would have been pointless for me to play the bitcoin lottery, which is set up so that the difficulty of winning increases the more people play it.
When bitcoin launched, my laptop would have had a reasonable chance of winning from time to time. So I set up an account with Mt. Gox, the leading bitcoin exchange, and transferred a hundred and twenty dollars. A few days later, I bought It was a simple transaction that masked a complex calculus.
In , Richard Nixon announced that U. Ever since, the value of the dollar has been based on our faith in it. We trust that dollars will be valuable tomorrow, so we accept payment in dollars today. Once you believe in it, the actual cost of a bitcoin—five dollars or thirty? Kim explained that he had started mining bitcoins two months earlier. He liked that the currency was governed by a set of logical rules, rather than the mysterious machinations of the Federal Reserve.
A dollar today, he pointed out, buys you what a nickel bought a century ago, largely because so much money has been printed. And, he asked, why trust a currency backed by a government that is fourteen trillion dollars in debt? He wanted bitcoin to succeed, and in order for that to happen businesses needed to start accepting it. Kim immediately exchanged the bitcoins I sent him for dollars to avoid just that risk.
Still, the currency is young and has several attributes that appeal to merchants. Robert Schwarz, the owner of a computer-repair business in Klamath Falls, Oregon, began selling computers for bitcoin to sidestep steep credit-card fees, which he estimates cost him three per cent on every transaction. Bitcoin does. At the Howard Johnson, Kim led us to the check-in counter.
The lobby featured imitation-crystal chandeliers, ornately framed oil paintings of Venice, and, inexplicably, a pair of faux elephant tusks painted gold. The receptionist handed me a room card, and Kim shook my hand. First of all, there is the flawless English. Over the course of two years, he dashed off about eighty thousand words—the approximate length of a novel—and made only a few typos. He covered topics ranging from the theories of the Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises to the history of commodity markets.
This is a reference to a Times of London article that indicated that the British government had failed to stimulate the economy. Nakamoto appeared to be saying that it was time to try something new. The text, hidden amid a jumble of code, was a sort of digital battle cry. It also indicated that Nakamoto read a British newspaper.
In an initial post announcing bitcoin, he employed American-style spelling. But after that a British style appeared to flow naturally. A Frenchman onstage was talking about testing the security of encryption systems. The most effective method, he said, is to attack the system and see if it fails. I ran my finger past dozens of names and addresses, circling residents of the United Kingdom and Ireland.
There were nine. They were happy to chat but entirely dismissive of bitcoin, and none had worked with peer-to-peer technology. The two other cryptographers from Britain had no history with large software projects. Then I started looking into a man named Michael Clear. Clear was a young graduate student in cryptography at Trinity College in Dublin.
A Web search turned up three interesting details. In , Clear was named the top computer-science undergraduate at Trinity. The next year, he was hired by Allied Irish Banks to improve its currency-trading software, and he co-authored an academic paper on peer-to-peer technology. The paper employed British spelling. Clear was well versed in economics, cryptography, and peer-to-peer networks. I e-mailed him, and we agreed to meet the next morning on the steps outside the lecture hall.
Shortly after the appointed time, a long-haired, square-jawed young man in a beige sweater walked up to me, looking like an early-Zeppelin Robert Plant. Shared substrates like the universe of gunk lashing a web browser together never entirely implement their specifications perfectly.
The map is not the territory, and models are always incomplete. We had full debuggers set up for our fuzzers. We would always know exactly what caused a particular crash. Time travel debugging would be awesome. I want to be cautious here, but I think this is important to say. Without a debugger, many crashes look identical. You would not believe the number of completely different things that can cause a web browser to give up the ghost. Same crash experience every time, though.
Waves, even interference waves, are actually a really generic failure mode. The same slits that will pass photons, will also pass air molecules, will also pass water molecules. Stick enough people in a stadium and give them enough beer and you can even make waves out of people. Systems at different scales do behave differently. The macro can be identical, the micro can be way, way different. Interference is fairly intuitive for multi-particle systems. Alright, photons spin through space, have constructive and destructive modes when interacting in bulk, sure.
It happens in single photon and electron systems too, though. And as much as I dislike non-locality, the experiment is always right. These systems behave as if they know all the paths they could take, and choose one. This does not necessarily need to be happening for the same reasons in single photon systems, as it is in long streams of related particles. It might be! Those waves will have similarities, because while the mechanisms are completely different, the ratios that drive them remain identical to the accuracy of each regime.
Bug collisions are extremely annoying. Not even wrong. No cryptographic interpretation of the results of Quantum Physics can explain that; you cannot operate on data you do not have. Pilot wave theory is a deterministic conception of quantum physics, not incompatible at all with this cryptographic conjecture, but it too has given up on locality.
You need to have an input, to account for it in your output. But the knowledge of the second slit is not necessarily absent from the universe as perceived by the single photon. And the information required is some factor of the ratio between slits, nothing else. The single particle also needs to pass through the slits. You know, there are vibratory modes.
Every laser assembly I see isolates the laser from the world. Matter is held together by electromagnetic attraction; a single photon versus a giant hunk of mass has more of an energy differential than myself and Earth. There just needs to be transfer of the slit distance.
Might be interesting to smoothly scale your photon count from single photon in the entire assembly not just reaching the photodetector , through blindingly bright, and look for discontinuities. There are many other things that have knowledge of the second photon path. Make things hot, or cold.
Introduce asymmetric geometries, make a photon entering the left slit see a different irrelevant reality than the photon entering the right. Or at least use different shapes between the slits, so that the vibratory paths are longer than crow flies distance. Mirrors and retroreflectors too. Use weird materials — ferromagnetic, maybe, or anti-ferromagnetic. Bismuth needs its day in the sun. You know what might be a great thing to make two slits out of? Three photodetectors!
Actually, cell phones have gotten chip sensors to be more sensitive than the human eye, which in the right conditions is itself a single photon detector. It can occur in femtoseconds and block an electron from the right slit while the left slit is truly none the wiser.
Just mess with it! Professors, tell your undergrads, screw things up. You might not even have to tell them that. And then you go set something on fire, and route your lasers through it. If any of this works, nobody would be more surprised than me. But who knows, maybe this will be like that time somebody suggested we just send an atomic clock into space to unambiguously detect time dilation from relativity.
A hacker can dream! But maybe I can ask a few questions. Technically a theory does not need to be correct to violate his particular formulation. It might actually be the case that this… Quantum Encraption is a local hidden variable theory that explains all the results of quantum mechanics. This approach absolutely does not predict a deterministic universe. Laser beams eventually decohere, just not immediately.
Systems can absolutely have a mix of entropy sources, some good, some not. The math still works just as predictably even with no actual randomness at all. Only if all entropy sources were deterministic at all scales could the universe be as well. MD5 is weak, a billion rounds of MD5 is not. So there would be no way to predict or influence the state of the universe even given perfect determinism without just outright running the system.
No communication. Also, please, feel free to mail me privately at dan doxpara. Offense is critical. Defense without Offense is after all just Compliance. But Defense could use a home. The Blue Team does not always have to be the away team.
Well, be careful what you wish for. I actually keynoted his Velocity event with Zane Lackey a while back, and was struck by the openness of the environment, and the technical competence of the attendees. How would you know if this is your sort of party? Can we predict the future authorship of security vulnerabilities? In what ways do languages themselves predict failures, independent of authors? If this interests you, this is your con. We live in a golden age of compilers actually trying to help us this was not always the case.
Think you can measure better? Cool, show us. Mitigations not living up to their hype? Security technologies actually hosting insecurity? I could speculate why, or I could just ask. It was a mistake to agree to publish my post before I saw his— I assumed his post would simply be a signed message anybody could easily verify.
Good on Gavin for his entirely reasonable reaction to this genuinely strange situation. I signed it! OK, yes, this is intentional scammery. This is the transaction. See this:. But Gavin. Wright is Satoshi is aggressively, almost-but-not-quite maliciously resistant to actual validation. OK, anyone can take screenshots of their terminal, but shasums of everything but the one file you actually would like a hash of? But it could actually be interesting. More is possible, but I think the point is made.
The reason why the new flaw is significantly more virulent is that:. In order to reach the overflow at line , the hostname argument must meet the following requirements:. Even Shellshock and Heartbleed tended to affect things we knew were on the network and knew we had to defend.
This affects a universally used library glibc at a universally used protocol DNS. Who can exploit this vulnerability? We know unambiguously that an attacker directly on our networks can take over many systems running Linux. What we are unsure of is whether an attacker anywhere on the Internet is similarly empowered, given only the trivial capacity to cause our systems to look up addresses inside their malicious domains.
We can do better than that. We need to develop and fund the infrastructure, both technical and organizational, that defends and maintains the foundations of the global economy. Click here if your interests are around security policy implications and not the specific technical flaw in question. And this galaxy is Linux — specifically, Ubuntu Linux, in a map by Thomi Richards, showing how each piece of software inside of it depends on each other piece.
And at this center, in this black hole, there is a flaw. How shocking? Just how much trouble are we in? What we know unambiguously is that an attacker who can monitor DNS traffic between most but not all Linux clients, and a Domain Name Server, can achieve remote code execution independent of how well those clients are otherwise implemented. Android is not affected. That is a solid critical vulnerability by any normal standard.
Ranking exploits is silly. But generally, what you can do is actually less important than who you have to be to do it. Bugs like Heartbleed, Shellshock, and even the recent Java Deserialization flaws ask very little of attackers — they have to be somewhere on a network that can reach their victims, maybe just anywhere on the Internet at large. By contrast, the unambiguous victims of glibc generally require their attackers to be close by.
More importantly though, the scale of software exposed to glibc is unusually substantial. For example:. Not that other C libraries should be presumed safe. That guy just got a whole new set of toys, against a whole new set of devices.
Everyone protects apache, who protects sudo? So, independent of whatever else may be found, Florian , Fermin , Kevin, and everyone else at Redhat and Google did some tremendous work finding and repairing something genuinely nasty. Patch this bug with extreme prejudice. DNS is how this Internet there were several previous attempts achieves cross-organizational interoperability.
Only they have the delegated ownership rights for gmail. Those rights were delegated by Verisign, who owns. The point is not to debate the particular trust model of DNS. If a DNS vulnerability could work through the DNS hierarchy , we would be in a whole new class of trouble, because it is just extraordinarily easy to compel code that does not trust you to retrieve arbitrary domains from anywhere in the DNS.
You send someone an email, they reply. How does their email find you? Their systems are going to look you up. Once, I gave a talk to two hundred software developers. I asked them, how many of you depend on DNS? Two hands go up. I then asked, how many of you expect a string of text like google.
Strings containing domain names happen all over the place in software, in all sorts of otherwise safe programming languages. Far more often than not, those strings not only find their way to a DNS client, but specifically to the code embedded in the operating system the one thing that knows where the local Domain Name Server is! Many more attackers can cause lookups to badguy.
It asks a question, it gets an answer, somebody else actually does most of the work running around the Internet bouncing through ICANN to Verisign to Google. DNS is an old protocol — it dates back to — and comes from a world where bandwidth was so constrained that every bit mattered, even during protocol design. These caching resolvers actually enforce a significant amount of rules upon what may or may not flow through the DNS. The proof of concept delivered by Google essentially delivers garbage bytes.
But name servers can essentially be modeled as scrubbing firewalls — in most never all environments, traffic that is not protocol compliant is just not going to reach stubs like glibc. Does that mean nothing will? According to Redhat :. A back of the envelope analysis shows that it should be possible to write correctly formed DNS responses with attacker controlled payloads that will penetrate a DNS cache hierarchy and therefore allow attackers to exploit machines behind such caches.
Actual exploit chains are subject to what I call the MacGyver effect. The show inspired an entire generation of engineers, but did not lead to a significant number of lost limbs because there was always something non-obvious and missing that ultimately prevented anything from working.
Exploit chains at this layer are just a lot more fragile than, say, corrupted memory. At the extreme end, there are discussions happening about widespread DNS filters across the Internet — certainly in front of sensitive networks. Redhat et al did some great work here, but we do need more than the back of the envelope. There is error handling in DNS, but most errors and retries are handled by the caching resolver, not the stub. That means any weird errors just cause the safer, more properly written middlebox to handle the complexity, reducing degrees of freedom for hitting glibc.
The trivial defenses against cache traversal are easily bypassable; the obvious attacks that would generate cache traversal are trivially defeated. That rule usually only applies to crypto vulns, but on this half-design half-implementation vuln, we get it here too.
No other way to say it. Redhat might as well have suggested filtering all AAAA IPv6 records — might actually be effective, as it happens, but it turns out security is not the only engineering requirement at play. DNS has had to engineer several mechanisms for sending more than bytes, and not because it was a fun thing to do on a Saturday night.
What is worth noting is that IT, and even IT Security, has actually learned the very very hard way not to apply traditional firewalling approaches to DNS. And ultimately, any DNS packet filter is a poor version of what you really want, which is an actual protocol enforcing scrubbing firewall, i. My expectations for mitigations, particularly as we actually start getting some real intelligence around cache traversing glibc attacks, are:.
A large number of embedded routers are already safe against the verified on-path attack scenario due to their use of dnsmasq, a common forwarding cache. Note that technologies like DNSSEC are mostly orthogonal to this threat; the attacker can just send us signed responses that he in particular wants to break us. I say mostly because one mode of DNSSEC deployment involves the use of a local validating resolver; such resolvers are also DNS caches that insulate glibc from the outside world.
There is the interesting question of how to scan and detect nodes on your network with vulnerable versions of glibc. Detecting what on our networks still needs to get patched especially when ultimately this sort of platform failure infests the smallest of devices is certain to become a priority — even if we end up making it easier for attackers to detect our faults as well. And again, large DNS replies are not necessarily malicious.
And thus, we end up at a good transition point to discuss security policy. What do we learn from this situation? Patch this bug. It will be somewhat disruptive. Patch this bug now, before the cache traversing attacks are discovered, because even the on-path attacks are concerning enough. And if patching is not a thing you know how to do, automatic patching needs to be something you demand from the infrastructure you deploy on your network.
If it might not be safe in six months, why are you paying for it today? Literally, six weeks before I unveiled my own grand fix to DNS July , this catastrophic code was committed. The Internet is not less important to global commerce than it was in Hacker latency continues to be a real problem. But the discussion on cybersecurity seems dominated by the necessity of insecurity. Did anyone know about this flaw earlier? We can only know we need to be finding these bugs faster, understanding these issues better, and fixing them more comprehensively.
There were clear public signs of impending public discovery of this flaw, so do not take my words as any form of criticism for the release schedule of this CVE. My concerns are not merely organizational. I do think we need to start investing significantly more in mitigation technologies that operate before memory corruption has occurred.
What can we do to the software we deploy, at what cost, to actually make exploitation of software flaws actually impossible, as opposed to merely difficult? It is unlikely this is the only platform threat, or even the only threat in glibc. A network where devices eventually become existential threats is a network that eventually ceases to exist.
Are there insurance structures that could pay out, when a glibc level patch needs to be rolled out? We can do better building the secure platforms of the future. TL:DR: The web is actually fantastic, and one of the cool things about it is the ability for mutually distrusting entities to share the same browser, or even the same web page. I want to fix that, and all other Clickjacking attacks. Generally the suggested solution involves pixel scraping, i.
But they do know what they send to the GPU. Web pages are like transparencies, one stacked over the next. Instead of auditing, we make it so the only thing that could be rendered, is what should be rendered. It works remarkably well, even just now. Bring the popcorn, but be discreet! Policy and Technology have some shared issues, that sometimes they want each other to solve. Meanwhile, things stay on fire. I talked about some of our challenges in Infosec with Die Zeit recently.
It clearly yields more secure code. That would be awful. I have doubts as to how strong those fears are, or remain. Subheading The American computer security specialist Dan Kaminsky talks about the cyber-attack on the German Bundestag: In an age of hacker wars, diplomacy is a stronger weapon than technology.
He made a name for himself with the discovery of severe security holes on the Internet and in computer systems of large corporations. Are the Germans sloppy when it comes to computer security? Dan Kaminsky: No one should be surprised if a cyber attack succeeds somewhere.
Everything can be hacked. I assume that all large companies are confronted somehow with hackers in their systems, and in national systems, successful intrusions have increased. The United States, e. Even teenagers can do that. And some of the most sensational computer break-ins in history are standard in technical terms — e. Three or four engineers manage that in three to four months. Kaminsky: Sometimes it is true, sometimes it is not. Of course, state institutions can work better, with less error rates, permanently and more unnoticed.
And they can attack very difficult destinations: e. They can prepare future cyber-attacks and could turn off the power of an entire city in case of an event of war. Kaminsky: There is a very old race among hackers between attackers and defenders. Nowadays, attackers have a lot of possibilities while defenders only have a few.
At the moment, no one knows how to make a computer really safe. Kaminsky: The situation can change. All great technological developments have been unsafe in the beginning, just think of the rail, automobiles and aircrafts. The most important thing in the beginning is that they work, after that they get safer. We have been working on the security of the Internet and the computer systems for the last 15 years….
Kaminsky: There is a whole movement for example that is looking for new programming methods in order to eliminate the gateways for hackers. If you follow the rules, it should be hard for a programmer to produce that kind of errors that would be used by hostile hackers later on. When a system executes a program in the future or when a software needs to process a data record, it will be checked precisely to see if all rules where followed — as if a grammar teacher would check them.
Kaminsky: It is a new technology, it is still under development. In the end it will not only be possible to write a secure software, but also to have it happen in a natural way without any special effort, and it shall be cheap. Kaminsky: Ongoing safety tests for computer networks are becoming more widespread: Firms and institutions pay hackers to permanently break-in in order to find holes and close them.
Third, there is a totally new generation of anti-hacker software in progress. Their task is not to prevent break-ins — because they will happen anyway — but to observe the intruders very well. This way we can assess better who the hackers are and we can prevent them from gaining access over days or weeks. What can we do today if we are already in possession of important data?
Go offline? Kaminsky: No one will go offline. That is simply too inefficient. Even today you can already store data in a way that they are not completely gone after a successful hacker attack. You split them. Does a computer user really ever need to have access to all the documents in the whole system? Does the user need so much system band width that he can download masses of documents? There are also a lot of hackers though who work for the NSA in order to break in other computer systems ….
Kaminsky: … yeah, and that is poison for the security of the net. The NSA and a lot of other secret services say nowadays: We want to defend our computers — and attack the others. Most of the time, they decide to attack and make the Internet even more unsafe for everyone.
Kaminsky: American secret services have known for more than a decade that a spy software can be saved on the operating system of computer hard disks. Instead of getting rid of those security holes, they have been actively using it for themselves over the years… The spyware was open for the secret services — who have been using it for a number of malwares that have been discovered recently— and for everyone who has discovered those holes as well.
Kaminsky: Yes, economically. If they made the Internet safer, they would hardly be rewarded for that…. ZEIT Online: A whole industry is taking care of the security of the net as well: Sellers of anti-virus and other protection programs. Kaminsky: Nowadays, we spend a lot of money on security programs. But we do not even know if the computers that are protected in that way are really the ones who get hacked less often. We do not have any good empirical data and no controlled study about that.
Kaminsky: This is obviously a market failure. The market does not offer services that would be urgently needed for increased safety in computer networks. A classical case in which governments could make themselves useful — the state. By the way, the state could contribute something else: deterrence.
Kaminsky: In terms of computer security, we still blame the victims themselves most of the time: You have been hacked, how dumb! But when it comes to national hacker attacks that could lead to cyber wars this way of thinking is not appropriate. Kaminsky: Usually nation states are good in coming up with collective punishments: diplomatic reactions, economic sanctions or even acts of war. It is important that the nation states discuss with each other about what would be an adequate level of national hacker attacks and what would be too much.
We have established that kind of rules for conventional wars but not for hacker attacks and cyber war. For a long time they had been considered as dangerous, but that has changed. You want to live in a cyber war zone as little as you want to live in a conventional war zone! We still do not know the ones who were responsible for the German Bundestag hack…. Kaminsky: Yeah, sometimes you do not know who is attacking you. In the Internet there are not that many borders or geographical entities, and attackers can even veil their background.
In order to really solve this problem, you would have to change the architecture of the Internet. Kaminsky: … and then there is still the question: Would it be really better for us, economically wise, than the leading communication technologies Minitel from France or America Online? Were our lives better when network connections were still horrible expensive?
And is a new kind of net even possible when well appointed criminals or nation states could find new ways for manipulation anyway? There are a lot of solutions though that are even worse than the problem itself. The debate is a ways in, and starts around here. Welcome, Dan. Jason is formerly with the Justice Department where he oversaw criminal computer crime, prosecutions, among other things, and is now doing criminal and civil litigation at Steptoe.
It gets rid of bulk collection across the board really. Stewart: Oh, absolutely. Michael: I think the only other thing I would mention is the restrictions on NSLs where you now need to have specific selection terms for NSLs as well, not just for orders.
Not that much change. Stewart: That will be a fight. Yeah, I have said recently that, sure, this new approach can be as effective as the old approach if you think that going to the library is an adequate substitute for using Google. But on the upside there are widespread rumors that the database never included many smaller carriers, never included mobile data probably because of difficulties separating out location data from the things that they wanted to look at. People will use call of duty or something to communicate.
It turns out, if I understand this right, that what NSA was looking for in that surveillance, which is a surveillance, was malware signatures and other indicia that somebody was hacking Americans, so they collected or proposed to collect the incoming communications from the hackers, and then to see what was exfiltrated by the hackers.
Are you going to stop malware? Are you going to hunt someone down? There is just such a lack of trust going on out there. Jason: Yeah. I thought to the extent that this is one of those things under , where I think a reasonable person will look at this and be appreciative of the fact that the government was doing this, not critical. The MasterCard settlement or the failed MasterCard settlement in the Target case, Jason, can you bring us up to date on that and tell us what lessons we should learn from it?
Jason: There have been so many high profile breaches in the last 18 months people may not remember Target, which of course was breached in the holiday season of MasterCard, as credit card companies often do, try to negotiate a settlement on behalf of all of their issuing banks with Target to pay damages for losses suffered as a result of the breach. There may be some decrease in privacy related class actions related to misuse of private information by providers, but when it comes to data breaches involving retailers and credit card information, I think not only are the consumer class actions not going anywhere, but the class actions involving the financial institutions are definitely not going anywhere.
Notify me of new posts via email. Enter your email address to subscribe to this blog and receive notifications of new posts by email. Email Address:. Sign me up! E-Mail Twitter Bio. Dan Kaminsky's Blog. Home Imagery lulz Security. Not maybe.
Not possibly. That would mean he has the private key, and is likely to be Satoshi. This is a lie. Update 2: OK, yes, this is intentional scammery. Like this: Like Loading Categories: Security. Comments 0 Trackbacks 0 Leave a comment Trackback. No comments yet. No trackbacks yet.
Leave a Reply Cancel reply Enter your comment here The reality of most software development is that the consequences of failure are simply nonexistent. Bitcoin reflects an entirely alien design regime. Ruby got burned pretty badly recently when some systems listening on the network were a little too … friendly. Engineering is a game of tradeoffs. So, of course, is business. But all that was obvious two years ago, when my fifteen point list of obvious likely bugs was systematically destroyed by a codebase that quite frankly knew better.
BitCoin is actually an exploit against network complexity. Not financial networks, or computer networks, or social networks. Networks themselves. Yes, the cost increases over time. BitCoin has something called a Blockchain, which is a list of all transactions that have ever occurred, ever. You can think of this as an account ledger, containing the content of every account, everywhere. The system fails, but when? Storage and bandwidth are themselves getting hilariously inexpensive.
My mistake two years ago was thinking too much like an engineer, and not enough like certain Business Insider readers. I actually have no idea what will happen when these chickens come home to roost. But the power of the masses is only shrinking. BitCoin made a technical choice during its initial design that allowed some people to do far more work than others, simply by having a graphical accelerator or even by designing custom hardware.
Much thanks to Michael Tiffany and Ash Kalb, with whom many of these issues were discussed. Insider logo The word "Insider". Close icon Two crossed lines that form an 'X'.
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